Thursday, December 1, 2011

Of Lowasa's defence and CCM disciplinary committee

After the ruling party’s (Chama cha Mapinduzi) National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting two weeks ago, heated debate on who won between former Prime Minister, Edward Lowasa and the anti-corruption crusaders led by party chairman, President Jakaya Kikwete.
For the first group in the divide, there is no dispute that Lowasa not only emerged victorious, but has shamed the other side.
But whether his victory is enough in recouping his lost political glory which could, by extension, later help him-if he so desired to vie for the 2015 presidential election under his party’s ticket, time will tell.
According to the first group, one thing is now crystal clear; the murkiness that had initially surrounded what has come to be referred to as the Richmond power generation scandal has at last been rendered somewhat clearer!
One, that there is nothing that Lowasa knew, as far as the Richmond scamdal is concerned, that his boss, the president, did not know.
 And secondly, that Lowasa had wanted to finish off Richmond, before it could turn into a scandal, in the same way he had done with City Water.
But in his (Lowasa’s) own words (going by print media reports), the president restrained him, arguing that he had been advised on the best way of handling the issue by his team of permanent secretaries.
Although Lowasa could not take his story on the planned ‘killing of Richmond’ further, it was not however, difficult to decipher the point he was driving to which is: ‘had you allowed me to go ahead with my knife, Richmond would not have reached where it reached’.
The latter statement marked Lowasa’s first political cleansing, and no one helped him in completing the exercise more than his own boss’ decision not to utter a word on the point.
Lowasa’s second score revolved around Kikwete administration’s decision not to take any administrative or legal action against technocrats whose conduct on Richmond had forced him to take political responsibility by stepping down from the premiership.
Lowasa buttressed his second score when he said even the parliamentary probe committee had censored him not for being responsible for Richmond, but rather for his failure to keep close watch over the technocrats who had brought in Richmond.
Again, there was no response from the president and Lowasa’s statement was once again issued with a clean certificate of health.
Lowasa was however, not done!
He reminded the party chairman about the 2003 incident in which the proverbial knives had been drawn out against him.
“Had it not been for President Mkapa’s wisdom, you would not have been sitting on that chair today,” Lowasa told the party chairman.
Again there was no response from the party chairman, once again giving Lowasa’s assertion a mark of credibility.
It was not difficult to decipher what Lowasa wanted to make out of the statement, that while Mkapa helped him, he did not save him from Richmond!
Lowasa’s careful choice of incidents and the mastery wording with which he delivered his self-initiated defence during the NEC meeting was subtly made in order to bring about maximum effect in his defence.
But for reasons best known to him, Lowasa did not venture into the nature of the 2003 incident that had been brought up against the party chairman, then minister for foreign affairs and international cooperation by Mr Paul Sozigwa.
If Lowasa could have the audacity of reminding the party chairman of the 2003 incident that had almost killed his dream of becoming the president of the United Republic of Tanzania, what would stop him, should he be forced into a corner, to go public on the said incident?
The manner with which he had narrated the 2003 incident was such it was intended to warn the party chairman of how far he was capable of taking him to task should the party publicity secretary, Nape Nnauye and the deputy secretary general, John Chiligati continue with their ‘mud-smearing’ campaigns against him.
 In a nutshell, Lowasa’s entire argument before the NEC meeting boiled down to one thing-through his resignation from premiership, he had already served his punishment.
Then the former Prime Minister, Frederick Sumaye took the floor, seeking his party’s intervention in case it transpired that allegations made by Mr Nnauye and Mr Chiligati against the so called corrupt elements within the party were false.
Mr Sumaye however, said that in case such allegations were proved, then punitive actions should be taken by the party immediately against the culprits.
What is however, unfortunate is that four days after the end of the NEC meeting, it transpired that what some of the mainstream newspapers had reported in relation to what Sumaye had said was twisted by a team of corrupted journalists!
Sumaye’s earlier version carried by a section of selected newspapers gave readers the impression that he had supported Lowasa!
The involvement of Tanzanian journalists in dirty politics is not new and was first ushered in the run-up for the 2005 general elections when a group of journalists at the Mwananchi Communications Limited used photo-shop program to play around with pictures of retired Tanzanian diplomat.
The objective behind their game was to ensure that he fails in his attempt to seek the highest office on the land, and the best way of getting the diplomat out of the race was linking him up with the assassination of the founder of the Zanzibar nation, Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume!
But instead of dealing with such journalists appropriately, some of them were later rewarded for their shameless conduct, but that is another story requiring another day.
Meanwhile the way the ruling party had carried out its public campaign against mafisadi, few would have expected the issue to have ended the way it did, namely in an anti-climax.
Indeed, many people who read stories related to the NEC meeting in most of the mainstream papers after the party deliberations did not expect President Kikwete to say what he is quoted by the print media to have said, that ‘let us leave out the magamba business and instead work on strengthening the party’!
But while the first group considered Lowasa a victory, the second does not.
In fact, to the contrary, they consider the last NEC meeting as having marked the beginning of the end for the former prime minister, especially after it was decided to take his case and that of others back to the party’s disciplinary committee.
To appreciate their arguments, it is important to take stock of issues raised by Lowasa, especially on the Richmond power generation scandal.
Although some people may consider Lowasa a victor, as far as the Richmond question is concerned, they argue that the president’s knowledge on the issue does not necessarily mean that he was involved.
As a team player, they say the president turned down Lowasa’s one-man-show in preference for a suggestion-cum-advice presented to him by his team of permanent secretary.
What is more, as a president, what was required of him was to have the big picture on Richmond as opposed to its details which was Lowasa’s docket with his team of technocrats.
Indeed, if one had expected the president to know the nitty-gritty of Richmond, then what would have been the point of having a prime minister (the head of government business) in the first place?
Some people have faulted the president’s no response stance during Lowasa’s defence.
However, the second group (in defence of the president) say as party chairman and chair of the NEC meeting, it would have been demeaning for him to engage in a ping-pong game with Lowasa!
Unlike the NEC meeting, at the party’s disciplinary body, evidence would have to be produced in order to get down to the role of each side in the dispute.
For instance, Lowasa’s resignation has to date been said both by the parliamentary probe committee and himself (during the NEC meeting) that he stepped down in order to take political responsibility.
The implication of the foregoing statement is that the technocrats rather than Lowasa were directly involved in the scandal.
However, at the disciplinary committee hearing things would be different!
Each side’s role in the Richmond scandal would have to be laid bare before disciplinary action are taken!
For instance, the technocrats would be required, if they want to save their skins, to produce evidence, in the form of memos, phone messages, letters and what have you, that directly link their action (in case they exist) with the former prime minister.
Reading the parliamentary probe committee’s report between the lines, it appears that much as those behind it were committed at exposing the rote in the Richmond scandal, they may have also wanted to protect Lowasa.
For instance, the government’s decision to leave the technocrats most of whom had already reached retiring age, scot free speaks volume their possible non-involvement in the Richmond scandal!
Indeed, if you want to protect someone from further punishment, surely you will not punish people who have nothing to do with the scandal.
Therefore had Lowasa remained silent, after his resignation, in the same way the second phase President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, had done in 1976 (when he along with Augustine Mrema, Peter Siyovelwa and others had resigned after the Mwanza prison incident), the situation would not have reached where it has.
In conclusion, Lowasa’s decision to remind the public, during the NEC meeting that his present fate was not different from Kikwete’s 2003 Paul Sozigwa incident, could, at the end of the day, turn out to be his major undoing.
By saying what he said on the 2003 incident, the former prime minister forgot that he was not dealing with his friend, but rather the President of United Republic of Tanzania.

By Attilio Tagalile 


















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