Thursday, December 1, 2011

Tanzania's foreign policy: Africa's independence tool and Dar's liberator

To understand and appreciate Tanzania’s foreign policy, a peep into two incidents, all involving the founding Father of the nation, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, will help in shedding light on the source and form of the country’s foreign policy.
The two incidents happened in 1957, during Ghana’s independence day celebration in Accra and in 1985 when Mwalimu Nyerere was bidding farewell to Nigeria, one of the countries that had helped Tanzania during its 1964’s army mutiny at the Colito Barracks in Dar es Salaam, presently known as Lugalo Barracks, named in honour of Chief Mkwawa’s Barracks at Kalenga in Iringa Rural District, Iringa Region.
Addressing journalists during a press conference held in Nigeria in the course of his visit to bid farewell to the Nigerian leadership midway in 1985 as he prepared to step down from Presidency after 23 years at the helm, Mwalimu was asked by one of the journalists the following question:
“Tanzania has had friends both in the East and West. Why has it (Tanzania) done so?”
Mwalimu responded in three words, sending Nigerian journalists into fits of laughter, he said; WE ARE POOR.
Indeed, a poor man does not have choice. He has to cultivate friendship with all the people, both from the east and west, hence Tanzania’s decision to pursue the policy of non-alignment.
It is also important to bear in mind that when Tanzania and some of her friends pursued the non-alignment foreign policy, it was at the height of the Cold War between the East, led by the then Soviet Union and the West led by the United States.
Since then, Tanzania has had the pleasure of not only seeking assistance from east and west, but also in criticizing both sides of the divide.
Other prominent founders of the foregoing policy included the then Yugoslavia President, Field Marshal Tito, Cuba’s President Fidel Castro and the Father of Malaysian modern economy,  Mohamed Mahathir.
Although the West has in the past heavily criticized those who chose the non-alignment policy, however, the truth still remains non-alignment policy pursuers have been able to save their nations from numerous problems.
The second incident which helped in influencing Tanzania’s foreign policy was the speech made by Ghana’s President, Dr Kwame Nkrumah at the climax of his country’s independence celebrations.
Dr Nkrumah said the independence of Ghana was meaningless as long as other countries in other parts of Africa remained in bondage.
The Ghanaian leader made the speech which would later be quoted several times by President Nyerere at the time when Kenyans were waging their liberation war (Mau Mau) against the British and apartheid held sway in South Africa, northern and southern Rhodesia which later became Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively.
Dr Nkrumah’s historic speech that has remained relevant to date implied the need on the part of other independent African states to help countries which were still languishing under racism and colonialism.
The rest is of course history, as imperialists through their lackeys and running dogs within the military clique in the Ghanaian armed forces did not allow Dr Nkrumah to remain in power, hence continue to preach freedom to the rest of the continent.
In 1966, the Ghanaian leader was overthrown by the US educated General Afrifa during his tour of Romania.
However, the toppling of Dr Nkrumah was not in vain as Tanzania took over the liberation struggle of countries still under racism and colonial yoke as one of the planks of its foreign policy.
Tanzania’s decision to implement Dr Nkruman’s statement in practice further received a shot in the arm when the Organization of African Unity, OAU, established the offices of the OAU Liberation Committee, in Dar es Salaam.
 Initially, the OAU Liberation Committee Office in Dar es Salaam was headed by Tanzania’s Ambassador Magombe as Executive Secretary.
However, later the post was filled in by Brigadier General Hashim Mbitta who has since retired from the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces, TPDF.
Before delving deeper into Tanzania’s implementation of the liberation struggle in central and southern Africa, it it would not be out of place to  look into, albeit in passing, on one issue that Africa’s detractors have always found delight in.
This is none other than their love to bring to the fore differences that existed between Mwalimu Nyerere and Dr Nkrumah in the realm of Africa’s integration.
It is indisputable that the two men differed quite considerably on how to bring about African union.
While Dr Nkrumah was in favour of immediate and total African union, Mwalimu preferred step by step integration (gradual) much as both men were agreed on one thing, African union.
Different outlook over Africa union between Mwalimu and Dr Nkrumah was, to some extent, a result of differences between themselves which could be attributed to many things that include, among others, differences in political background and experiences between the two statesmen.
Mwalimu admitted over Dr Nkrumah’s political experience in his live broadcast address from Zanzibar on February 5th 1977 during the climax of the merger between two political parties, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) which had brought independence to Tanganyika and the Afro Shirazi Party which had spearheaded Zanzibar’s revolution on January 12th 1964.
Mwalimu had this to say: “Circumcision is not painful if it is carried out on a person during one’s childhood.”
However, he said, circumcision was a different ball game if it was carried out during one’s adulthood.
Mwalimu compared the Union (and the only living union one in the continent) between Tanganyika and Zanzibar to circumcision carried out during childhood.
He said the union between the two countries that came into being on April 26th  1964 was possible and had lasted that long because Zanzibar came on board less than three months after its revolution.
Mwalimu’s argument was that it would not have been possible for the two countries to forge the union many months after the revolution after Zanzibar leaders had got used to the trappings of leadership.
He said when Dr Nkrumah called for African Union immediately, the Ghanaian leader was better informed than them on the challenges that awaited African countries, and in particular, trappings that accompanied such positions that include, among others, motor outriders, inspection of guard of honours, high salaries and other fringe benefits, and above all, power which always ended up corrupting its holder!
Mwalimu’s Zanzibar speech was an admission, on his part, that Dr Nkruman said what he said in relation to African Union because he was more experienced than him.
Therefore, Mwalimu’s differences with Dr. Nkrumah would only make sense had he not appreciated and learnt from the Ghanaian leader!
Having bought the Ghanaian leader’s argument on the need for independent African countries to help, militarily if possible, those still languishing under racist, colonial yoke; Mwalimu prepared his country for the struggle of other countries.
In fact nothing helped to shape Mwalimu’s vision towards the liberation struggle than Dr Nkrumah’s overthrow and his country’s own army mutiny in 1964.
He realized that unless the country’s armed forces were transformed into peoples’ liberation army, Tanzania would get nowhere in its effort to help those still under racism and colonial bondage.
This then saw the emergence of what in Mwalimu’s own words, ‘the formation of small, but scientific liberation army’.
Instead of sending Tanzanians abroad for officer training course at Sandhurst in Britain, Tanzania came up with its own military staff college, tailored to meet Tanzania and Africa’s needs.
Politically, efforts were made to forge a cohesive nation that would readily help the army in its liberation role.
That is why military forays into Tanzania by Portuguese forces from Mozambique and bombings of the Salander Bridge in Dar es Salaam, jet fighter bombardment of Mtwara and other parts in southern Tanzania and finally, the killing, through a parcel bomb, of the Frelimo (Mozambique’s liberation party) failed to shake off Tanzanians.
In fact, if anything, such attacks against Tanzania helped in strengthening Tanzanians’ resolve to help their government in lending support to liberation movements such as frelimo, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front)in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), SWAPO in Namibia and the MPLA in Angola.
This explains why, during the time, it was easy to hear Tanzanians contributing money and materials for liberation struggle in southern Africa.
In order to help members of liberation movements in southern Africa carry out their armed struggle into the den of their enemies, Tanzania established training camps at Mgagao, in Iringa for South Africans and Farm 17 in Nachingwea, southern Tanzania for Frelimo fighters.
In some instances, Tanzanians fought side by side with members of liberation movements and by May 1994, the southern Africa was free from colonial and racial bondage, after the birth of democratic and majority ruled South Africa.
During the same period, it would be recalled how the West tried to arm twist Tanzania and Zambia into getting involved in road project rather than a more reliable form of transportation through the construction of a railroad from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia.
The two African countries wanted to have an alternative transport route for Zambia in order to empower the central African country in implementing sanctions against rebel Southern Rhodesia.
And because Zambia relied on the Durban route both for its imports and exports, especially of its major foreign exchange earner, copper which is extremely heavy, it could only implement sanctions against Zimbabwe if it had an alternative route to the sea.
Therefore when the West insisted on being ready to help in the construction of a road, both Tanzania and Zambia turned to the Chinese government, hence the construction of the Uhuru railway (the Tanzania Zambia Railway) at a cost of 2bn US dollars.
Construction of the railway line started in 1970 and was completed in 1976, marking the biggest Chinese financed project in Africa.
In the northern part of the country, Tanzania managed to get rid of Uganda’s dictator Idi Amin who had in October 1978, invaded Kagera Salient killing many innocent Tanzanians.
The eight months bush war which ended in May 1979 to date remains the only successful war carried by an independent country against another independent country but under the yoke of a repressive regime.
In the words of a an American Reuters’ Correspondent and author of the War in Uganda, Mr Tony Avirgan, Tanzania won the war against a better equipped Ugandan army because it had succeeded in transforming the fighting into a peoples’ war.
There have always been numerous arguments over the timing of dictator Amin’s invasion of Tanzania.
Despite military skirmishes between the two sides in the course of Amin’s eight year rule in Uganda, the Ugandan leader had faced no threat from Tanzania.
And if that is so, why did he order the invasion of a country that presented no military threat to his country?
Is it possible that Amin’s decision to invade Tanzania was engineered by a foreign country or power?
Interestingly, just when Amin’s troops invaded the Kagera Salient, a TPDF brigade strength that was to be sent to Namibia to help Swapo in their liberation struggle was about to complete its training in Ruvuma Region.
And by the time the invasion of the Kagera Salient was complete, the Brigade under Brigadier General Barton Lupembe was the most war prepared in the entire TPDF.
According to Tony Avirgan, the Brigade which would in April 1979, but this time under the spear wielding Colonel Benjamin Msuya (now retired Major General), captured Uganda’s capital city, Kampala in April 1979, did not lose a single soldier in the whole military campaign, hence reflecting its high preparedness.
As chairman of the frontline states in liberation struggle, Tanzania played a major role in hastening the liberation of Zimbabwe which was made difficult by massive support rendered by the West led by the United States and Britain.
For instance when the OAU called on the British government to punish Southern Rhodesia’s rebel leader, (Prime Minister), Ian Smith for his decision to declare unilateral independence (UDI) against Britain, the latter refused!
Although it had been agreed between and among OAU member states to cease diplomatic relations with Britain if she refused to take action against rebel Smith, at the end of the day only two countries, Tanzania and Zambia acted, breaking diplomatic relations with Britain!
Economically, through the foregoing decision, Tanzania suffered a lot as Britain was the leading contributor to the country’s aid.
This was the second time Tanzania had elected to lose foreign aid through its decision to stand on the side of the oppressed majority in Zimbabwe.
The first time was in 1965 when West Germany was forced out by Tanzania over Zanzibar’s decision to allow the opening of a diplomatic Consul of East Germany in Zanzibar.
The West Germany government asked Mwalimu to bring pressure to bear on the Zanzibar leader, Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume to close the East Germany Consul, but Mwalimu refused, arguing-rightly that much as Zanzibar was part of the Union, however, it was a sovereign state.
At this point, the West Germany government which was assisting Tanzania in building its paratroopers within the TPDF, health and other sectors threatened to stop all aid with the exception of health assistance, and this for humanitarian reasons.
But to the surprise of Germans, Mwalimu told them to pack up all their assistance and leave!
In a nutshell, the West Germany incident reflected, and continues to, Tanzania’s foreign policy independence that includes, among others, the ability to say No to anyone under the sun regardless who that person is!
The foregoing stance was repeated recently by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr Bernard Membe when he told the local media that Tanzania was ready to forgo all British government’s assistance if the condition was to recognize gay rights.
Following the Tanzania government’s position, the British government quickly barked off!
Support to the liberation struggle in the continent aside, Tanzania has also played a major role as peace maker in central African countries of Burundi and Rwanda.
In fact, had the Rwandan leadership of General Juvenal Habyarimana hastened implementation of the peace accord that had for years been forged by Tanzania, the 1994 genocide that saw the slaughtering of over one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus would not have happened!
With the end of the liberation struggle in southern Africa, partly finalized by the second phase government of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi; the foreign policy of the third phase administration of President Benjamin Mkapa was characterized by peace missions and conflict resolutions.
It started with Tanzania’s full participation in Burundi’s peace mission under the tutelage of Mwalimu Nyerere as chairman of the peace process.
Regionally, Tanzania joined the rest of former EAC members- Kenya and Uganda in discussions aimed at reviving the East African Community, EAC, which had collapsed on February 6th 1977.
And on November 31st 1999, the EAC was re-established. It did not take long, before the EAC membership was boosted following the incorporation of Rwanda and Burundi, hence bringing the new EAC membership to five.

A SHIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY


However, Tanzania’s foreign policy received a major boost in the first years of the fourth phase administration of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete when it was transformed to include economic goals.
The move was partly due to domestic shift of the country’s economic development which can be traced as far back as the second phase administration that saw the introduction of market economic policies coupled with liberalization.
Tanzania’s envoys abroad were recalled home and taken through the importance of focusing on the country’s economic interests in their day to day operations in their respective missions abroad.
The objective of the foregoing policy, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is, among others, to project, promote and protect Tanzania’s political, economic, social and economic interests through active and sustainable economic diplomacy.
·          To ensure that Tanzania’s relations with other nations and international institutions are also driven consonance with its economic interests
·          To build a self-sustaining economy, preservation of national peace and security as well as support regional and international endeavor for the creation of better and peaceful world.
·          To accelerate the political and social economic integration for the region and create necessary conditions which shall enable Tanzania to participate effectively in regional and international negotiations.
To the Tanzanian envoys, the message was simple: Gone were the days when they were expected to confine themselves to issues revolving around diplomatic niceties and other inexplicable concerns!
From now on, the name of the game was the country’s economic wellbeing.
 They were now expected to compliment the country’s economic endeavor at home in bringing bona fide investors.
In a nutshell, Tanzania’s embassies abroad were now supposed to serve as centers through which would-be investors could get responses on their inquiries on whatever they wanted to have or do in Tanzania.
Conversely, the Tanzanian government or any of the country’s economic institution for that matter, expected to get reliable information, as far as economic issues are concerned, from Tanzania’s embassies.
 

  By Attilio Tagalile


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